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I. DISTRIBUTION

A.

Cosimex - Court of FirstInstance Ruling

On December 6, 1989, the Court of First Instance of the
European Court handed down its first-ever ruling in Cosimex
GmbH v. Commission,". rejecting the request of the German
company Cosimex GmbH (Cosimex) for the adoption of interim
measures against the French company Socidt6 d'Hygi~ne
Dermatologique de Vichy (Vichy). In its complaint to the
Commission, Cosimex alleged that Vichy had pressured
wholesalers in France and Belgium to refuse to supply
dermatological products to Cosimex in violation of Article 85(1),
and requested the Commission to impose interim measures
prohibiting Vichy from taking any action to prevent the wholesalers
from supplying them with the products. The Commission denied
Cosimex's request on the grounds that there was insufficient proof
that the wholesalers' refusal to supply resulted from a concerted
practice in violation of Article 85(1), but stated that the allegations
would be considered in its analysis of Vichy's distribution system
under the notification procedure. Cosimex requested the Court of
First Instance to annul the Commission's decision and to compel
the Commission to reconsider their request for interim measures.
The Court, referring to the judgment in Camera Care,2 held that
pursuant to the Treaty and Regulation 17, the determination of
whether the adoption of interim measures was warranted lay within
the competence of the Commission and that it would not be in
conformity with the principles guiding the division of competence
between Community institutions if the Court forced the
Commission to reconsider the request for interim measures.

1.
Case 131/89, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 63) 6 (1990).
2.
Camera Care, Ltd. v. Comm'n, Case 792/79, Judgment of January 17, 1980 (1980 E.
Comm. CL L Rep. 119).
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B. Sandoz - Advocate General's Opinion
On October 10, 1989, Advocate General Van Gerven delivered
his opinion in Case No. 277/87, Sandoz ProdottiFarmaceuticiv.
Commission. The case concerned an appeal, by the Italian
subsidiary of the Swiss Sandoz group to annul the Commission's
decision to impose a fine of ECU 800,000 for restrictive practices
preventing parallel imports in violation of Article 85(1). In
particular, Sandoz had printed "export forbidden" on its invoices.
Sandoz denied the existence of any agreements with its clients
concerning parallel imports, stating that the invoice was purely an
accounting document which did not form part of any contractual
relations. The company further contended that the invoices did not
form part of a distribution network or framework agreement falling
within Article 85(1), alleging that every sale was a separate and
distinct transaction. The Advocate General rejected the party's
argument, taking the view that the invoice and words contained
therein should be considered part of the overall contractual
relations. The Advocate General stated that unilateral actions taken
by one party during the contract of which the other party could
reasonably be expected to be aware and which were not opposed
by that other party may be considered as forming part of a
contractual agreement within the meaning of Article 85(1).
As to the amount of the fine, Sandoz argued that the
Commission had (i) failed to take into account the effects of the
export ban which were not particularly harmful and (ii) erroneously
calculated the fine on the basis of global turnover rather than on
the basis of turnover only in the part of the market particularly
affected by parallel imports. With regard to the latter argument,
the Advocate General found that the Commission properly
calculated the fine on the basis of global turnover. Global turnover
was a proper basis for the fine because the expoit prohibition had
been printed on all the company's invoices, indicating the gravity
and extent of the violation, and because parallel imports play an
important role in the integration of the pharmaceuticals market. In
view of the seriousness of the offenses and the size and economic
power of the appellants, the Advocate General considered that the
552

1990/ EEC Competition Law
amount of the fine was justified. As a result, the Advocate General
recommended that the Court reject the request to annul the
Commission's decision and also reject the subsidiary's appeal for
a reduction of the fine.
C. Bayer - ECU 500,000 Fine Imposed for Restrictions on
ParallelImports
According to an official press release dated December 14,
1989, the Commission fined Bayer AG, a German chemical
undertaking, ECU 500,000 for agreements between Bayer AG and
all of its customers operating in the feedingstuffs industry. Under
the agreements, customers purchasing the growth promoter "Bayon-ox premix 10%" were required to use the product exclusively to
cover their own requirements in the factory to which it was
delivered. Since the German patent had expired in 1985, the
Commission found that the purpose of the obligation was to
prevent German purchasers of Bayo-n-ox from reselling and
exporting the product to other Member States where patent
protection still existed.
D. Para-PharmaceuticalProducts- Negative Clearance
According to an official press release dated December 19,
1989, the Commission decided to grant a negative clearance with
respect to a standard agreement between the Belgian Association
of Pharmacists (APB) and Belgian or foreign manufacturers of
para-pharmaceutical products concerning the distribution of such
products in Belgium.
The standard agreement gives the
manufacturers the right to affix the APB mark of approval on
products which have been tested and approved by the APB. The
manufacturer undertakes, inter alia, to sell products bearing the
mark only through affiliated pharmacies but is free to sell the
product, without a stamp, through other distribution networks. The

3.
The manufacturers produce items such as toiletries, cosmetics, dietary products, baby
foods, and vitamins.
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Commission had objected to an initial version of the agreement
under which manufacturers were prohibited from selling the APB
approved products other &an through pharmacies, even without the
mark, since a requirement that certain products be distributed only
through pharmacies violated Article 85(1). Following modification
of the agreement to provide that manufacturers and wholesalers are
completely free to sell the products through all types of distribution
channels, the Commission determined that the agreement no longer
fell within the scope of Article 85(1).
II. COOPERATION, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, AND
SPECIALIZATION

A.

Competition Investigations - Court Clarifies Commission's
Powers

Within a month of its decision in Hoechst,' the European
Court issued four judgments that further clarified the Commission's
power to investigate companies under Article 14 of Regulation 17.
All four decisions concerned investigations by the Commission into
restrictive practices in the polyvinylchloride/polyethylene markets.
In the first two judgments, issued on October 17, 1989, the
Court upheld the Commission's order for an investigation under
Article 14(3) of Regulation 17/62.- The Court reiterated its
holding in Hoechst, ruling that Article 190 of the Treaty and
Article 14(3) of Regulation 17 required the Commission to indicate
clearly the suspicions that it wished to verify. The criteria was
satisfied in these two cases by reasoning which, although worded
in general terms, stated matters indicating the existence and
application of agreements or concerted practices in violation of
Article 85(1).

4.

Hoechst AG v. Comm'n, Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Judgment of September 21,

1989.
5.
Dow Benelux N.V. v. Comm'n, Case 85/87, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 288) 4 (1989),
and Dow Chem. lbdrica SA, Alcudia SA and Empresa Nacional del Petrokeo SA, Joined Cases 97,
98 and 99/87, O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 285) 4 (1989).
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In the Dow Benelux case,6 the company sought to rely on
Article 20 of Regulation 17 to the effect that information obtained
during an investigation could not be used for purposes other than
those indicated in the decision ordering the investigation. The
parties argued that evidence obtained under a separate decision to
investigate some years earlier was inadmissible as evidence on
which to base a later decision to investigate. The Court decided,
however, that it could not be concluded that the Commission could
not open an investigation procedure in order to verify or add to
information that it happened to obtain during an earlier
investigation if such information indicated the existence of conduct
contrary to the competition rules laid down in the Treaty.
The last two judgments,' both issued on October 18, 1989,
held that the Commission, when pursuing an investigation, could
not force a company to answer certain types of questions which
would incriminate it. The Court ruled that in order to preserve the
effectiveness of Article 11 of Regulation 17, the Commission could
require a company to furnish all the necessary information which
the Commission had a right to know, and to supply any documents
in the company's possession relating to those matters, even if the
latter may serve to establish the existence of anti-competitive
However, the Commission could not force an
behavior.
undertaking to respond to questions by which the latter would be
directly led to admit the existence of an infringement.
The permissible questions included those which sought to
establish factual information as to the dates, freqluency of and
participants in meetings between producers, and even those relating
to price fixing, to the extent that the Commission was attempting
to obtain more detailed factual information regarding such
initiatives. On the other hand, certain questions on prices were
unacceptable in so far as they concerned the objective pursued by
such action and were of a conclusive nature. The court rejected
one question which sought to obtain detailed information on

Dow Benelux N.Y. v. Comm'n, Case 85/87, OJ. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 288) 4 (1989).
6.
Orkem v. Comm'n, Case 347/87, and Solvay v. Commn'n, Case 27/88, OJ. Eut. CoMM. 7.
(No. C 288) 5 (1989).
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"every step or concerted measure likely to have been considered
or adopted to support price initiatives." The Court ruled that this
question obliged companies to admit their participation. in
agreements intended to fix prices and restrict competition, or to
admit that such was their intention. The same applied to questions
regarding quotas, targets, and shares between the producers, which
had been phrased in such a way that the company would be led to
admit its participation in agreements intended to limit or control
production or distribution, or to partition markets. As a result, the
Court held that the latter two decisions were void as regards the
unacceptable questions.
B. Dutch Bankers' Association - Appeal of Commission Decision
On October 2, 1989, Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging and
Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken brought an action in the
European Court challenging the Commission's July 19, 1989,
decision in which an agreement concerning transfers relating to
fund-raising acceptances was deemed restrictive of competition
within the meaning of Article 85(1).' The Commission found that
the provision for an interbank commission on such transfers
restricted the scope for the relevant banks to agree bilaterally on
reimbursements of costs in a more favorable way, but determined
that the agreement fell outside Article 85(1) since it had no effect
on trade between Member States. The applicants claimed that the
agreement did not restrict competition to an appreciable extent
because a similar result would in any event have come about as a
result of the free operation of the market and of the fact that a
drawee bank had no freedom of choice in the matter of the payee
bank which is determined by its customers. The applicants further
claimed an infringement of essential procedural requirements under
Regulation 17 and also Regulation 99/63.

8.
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OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 293) 10 (1989).
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C. Welded Trellis - DecisionsAppealed
During the period under review, a number of firms have
appealed the Commission's August 2, 1989, decision to fine
fourteen Community producers of welded steel mesh a sum totaling
ECU 9.5 million for agreements and concerted practices designed
to fix prices or delivery quotas and share markets between 1981
and 1985.' The following are applying to the Court: (i) Belgian
firms, Steelinter SA and Usines Gustave Boel SA; (ii) French
firms, La Soei~t6 Metallurgique de Normandie, Tr6filunion, La
Societ6 des Treillis et Panneaux Soud s and Sotralentz SA; (iii)
Italian firms, Ferriere Nord SpA, ILRO SpA and GB Martinelli fu
GB Metallurgica SpA; (iv) a Luxembourg firm, Socit6 Tr6filarbed
Luxembourg-Saarbriicken Sirl; and (v) a German firm,
Baustahlgewebe GmbH.
D. KSB/Goulds/Lowara/7T - ProposedExemption
On October 12, 1989, the Commission published a notice
pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17 announcing its intention
to adopt a favorable decision with respect to agreements between
KSB, Goulds, Lowara, and ITT." The agreements in question
provide for joint research, development and production of the wet
end (parts in contact with fluid) of a new type of single-stage
single flow radial centrifugal pump made from chrome-nickel steel,
with Lowara as manufacturer of the pump components and each
partner assembling the pump individually. The German company,
KSB, is the world's leading pump manufacturer. Goulds Pumps,
an American registered company, is, together with its whollyowned Italian subsidiary, Lowara Spa, the third largest pump
manufacturer in the world. ITT Fluid Transfer Division is a part
of ITT Fluid Technology Corporation which in turn is one of nine
main divisions of the ITT Corporation. The pumps that are the
subject of the cooperation agreement form part of the market for

9.
10.

OJ. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 306) 6 (1989).
OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 259) 5 (1989).
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single-stage, single-flow radial centrifugal pumps for water.
The relevant geographical market is the entire Common Market
since the pumps are regularl / supplied and purchased in all
Member States. KSB's market share in Germany and in France is
between twenty and thirty percent, with a substantial market share
in both the Benelux countries and in Italy. Lowara has a
considerable market share in Italy.
Goulds and ITT have
insignificant market shares. At the time of notification, the parties
estimated their joint share in the Community at under twenty
percent. There are some seventy water pump manufacturers in the
Community, with fierce competition in prices and quality and an
excess capacity situation. In addition, conventional cast-iron
pumps are increasingly being supplied from non-Community
countries.
Under the first agreement, which remains in effect for a period
of ten years, work on research and development is to be decided
jointly by the parties and then carried out individually. The
agreement also provides that Lowara is the manufacturer of the
units." The participants assemble the units into pumps bearing
their own proprietary trade mark. Intellectual property rights to
developments are owned by the developing participant; the other
participants have a perpetual royalty-free license to use any such
intellectual property only upon the termination of the agreement or
the withdrawal of the participant from the agreement. The
participants agree not to exchange any information which would
impair the maintenance of competition outside the scope of the
agreement. Rights, duties, and interests under the agreement may
only be assigned with the written assent of each of the other
participants. Upon termination of the agreement all participants
receive a complete copy of all the know-how and have perpetual
royalty-free non-exclusive licenses. Under the second agreement,
the production agreement, Lowara agrees to manufacture the pump
components exclusively for the participants.
According to the parties, the agreement is necessary because
none of them would, on their own, be able to develop the high11.
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grade steel parts required, since the development costs are too high
compared with the small number of items which an individual
manufacturer requires. The parties further contend that such
cooperation does not entail any loss of innovative competition, and
maintain that in so far as the wet end components of the pump are
concerned, the parties were never potential competitors. With
regard to the other components and the marketing of the new
pumps, the participants continue to be in competition with one
another.
E. Italian Fire Insurers - ProposedExemption
In an Article 19(3) notice, published during the period under
review, 2 the Commission indicated that it would adopt a favorable
decision with respect to an agreement concluded by a non-profit
association of insurance companies known as the "Concordato
Italiano Incendio Rischi Industriali" (CIIRI). CIRI's activities
concern the insurance of industrial risks located in Italy and
supplementary fire and consequential loss insurance. Association
membership is open to all fire insurance companies authorized to
do business in Italy, and in February, 1988, when the notice was
published, the membership included twenty-eight companies,
covering approximately fifty percent of the industrial fire insurance
market. The association involves, inter alia, cooperation in the
form of the collection of industrial fire insurance statistics for the
calculation of premiums, the updating of required premium rates
and the fixing with the member concerned of required premiums
for risks which because of their size or nature are not included in
the tariff. Members are then invited to quote risks on the basis of
the required rates of the industrial fire insurance tariff to which
they can add commissions and general costs calculated on the basis
of their own viability. Members are also provided with a standard
fire insurance policy. The CIIRI must be notified of any departure
from the standard agreement if such departure is likely to affect the
uniformity of statistics. The agreement which entered into force on
12.

OJ. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 259) 3 (1989).

559

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 3
January 1, 1988, is valid for two years but has been tacitly
renewed. The Commission required various modifications (not
specified in the notice) before adopting a favorable attitude to the
eventual fori of the agreement.
F. AMB/La FondiariaAssicurazioni - Comfort Letter
According to a November 7, 1989, official press release, the
Commission sent a "comfort letter" to Aachener und Munchener
Beteiligungs-Aktiengesellschaft (AMB), a German insurance group,
and La Fondiaria Assicurazioni SpA, an Italian insurance company,
regarding their joint acquisition of Volksfursorge Deutsche
Lebensversicherung AG (VDLAG), and an accompanying
cooperation agreement.
All three are parent companies, of
insurance groups with activities in various insurance classes in their
respective national markets. The first two parties each acquired
twenty-five percent plus one share of VDLAG. This acquisition
was part of a general cooperative plan reached between AMB and
La Fondiaria under which each party would offer the other the
opportunity to participate in its activities, including new business
initiatives in other Member States. The parties agreed to cooperate
in the management of VDLAG with AMB taking the leading role.
The parties also have concluded an agreement with
Betelligungsgesellschaft fur Gemeinwirtschaft, a holding company
owned by German trade unions which retains the remainder of the
shares of VDLAG, providing for cooperation as far as the
management of the VDLAG is concerned. The Commission
anticipated no appreciable or unacceptable reduction in competition
as a result of this agreement.
G. Interbank Agreements on Interest Rates - Commission
Surveillance
According to a November 16, 1989, official press release, the
European Commissioner for Competition and Financial Affairs, Sir
Leon Brittan, wrote a letter to the European Banking Federation,
explaining that interbank agreements concerning interest rates

560
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restrict competition in the same way as price cartels. Sir Brittan
indicated that agreements on interest rates should be avoided or
abandoned, but the letter was of a general nature, and did not
mention any specific agreements. The Commissioner also indicated
that the normal use of monetary instruments would not infringe
Community competition rules providing that public authorities did
not encourage the formation of illicit cartels or reinforce their
effects.
H. JATA - Exemption Doubtful
According to press reports, the Commission decided on
December 4, 1989, to express doubts13 on the availability of an
exemption under Article 85(3) for the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) system of cargo tariff coordination for
international air freight transport between Community airports.
Although most of the 100 IATA "resolutions" concerned
agreements fixing fares and conditions of carriage, the resolutions
also involved so-called "interlining" arrangements, whereby
airlines could interchange the handling of a product. According to
the press reports, the Commission stated that the resolutions
notified were likely to restrict competition and that IATA had not
shown that the restrictions relating to interlining agreements and
certain types of cargo were recompensed by. advantages for
consumers.
L

Air France and Air Inter - Exemption Doubtful

According to press reports published during the period under
review, on October 25, 1989, the Commission decided to express
doubts on the request for an exemption under Article 85(3) for a
route-swapping deal between Air France and Air Inter. The deal,
which came into effect March 1989, allowed Air France to serve
French domestic routes from Paris to Bordeaux, Lyon, Marseille,

13.
3975187.

The Commission is empowered to express such doubts under Article 5 of Regulation
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Montpeiller, and Nantes, under the flag of the domestic carrier, Air
Inter. Similarly, Air Inter was permitted to operate international
routes to London, Athens, Rome, Madrid, and Ibiza under Air
France's flag. The deal allowed each airline to serve routes
normally the exclusive reserve of the other, though the legal rights
to the route remained unchanged. The Commission stated that the
companies were unable to show that the agreement was
indispensable for introducing new flights, that the rate autonomy of
each airline was assured or that the sharing of operation profits did
not prevent the companies from operating the lines in question in
a truly independent way. Thus, the Commission decided that
agreement either had to be abandoned or be substantially modified
to conform with competition rules.
J

Air France - FurtherDeals Not Exempted

According to press reports, the Commission on November 9,
1989, expressed doubts that further route-swap pacts between Air
France and Iberia Airlines, Alitalia and Sabena, respectively, would
obtain exemptions under Article 85(3). The Commission was of
the view that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that such
pacts were indispensable for the maintenance in operation of the
routes concerned, and moreover that the joint operation was likely
to restrict the possibility of any competition on those routes. The
routes concerned were (i) Air France and Air Iberia - six weekly
flights on the Paris-Bilbao-Santiago route; (ii) Air France and
Alitalia - the Paris-Milan and Paris-Turin routes; and (iii) Air
France and Sabena - the Paris-Brussels, Bordeaux/ToulouseBrussels, Lyon/Marseille-Brussels routes. All the swap agreements
had actually been in operation for a considerable period of time.
As a result of the Commission's objections, the deals will have to
be radically modified or abandoned.
K Air France - Three Agreements with Small Airlines
According to press reports, the Commission decided on
November 13, 1989, to exempt under Article 5 of Regulation
562
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3975/87 route-swap deals between (i) Air France and Luftverkehrs
AG; (ii) Air France and Brymon; and (iii) Sabena and London City
Airways that had resulted in the opening of new routes. The routes
concerned were (1) Air France and Luftverkehrs AG - ParisNurenburg; (ii) Air France and Bryman - Paris-London City
Airport; and (iii) Sabena and London City Airways - BrusselsLondon City Airport. The Commission granted an exemption for
six years, but reserved the right to re-evaluate the exemption after
two years.
The Commission granted these agreements an
exemption because (i) they concerned cooperation between a
national airline and a smaller airline resulting in the opening of
new routes; and (ii) in certain circumstances, the new organization
of a route or the opening of a new route would only be possible
through the conclusion of a joint operation agreement.
III. JOINT VENTURES

A.

Cekacan - ProposedExemption

On November 21, 1989, the Commission published a notice
pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17 announcing its intention
to adopt a favorable decision with respect to an agreement between
the Swedish firm, Akerlund and Rausing 4 (A&R), and the
German firm, Europa Carton Aktiengesellschaftt5 (ECA). 6 The
product consists of a new type of hermetic packaging in laminated
cardboard, primarily intended for dry, oxygen-sensitive food
products.
Ceka International, a division of A&R, obtained
ownership of the Cekacan patents, know-how, and trademarks, after
it purchased the Swedish company, Esselte Pac Aktiebolag.
Thereupon, ECA became A&R's licensee with an exclusive right
to exploit Cekacan machines for manufacture of the product in
Germany until the signature of the cooperation agreement in

14.
15.
paperboard
16.

Akerlund and Rausing's activities mainly comprise of packaging foodstuffs.
Europa Carton Aktiengesellschaft's activities are chiefly in the paperboard and
packaging sector.
OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. C 293) 4 (1989).
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question. This license which had originally been held by ECA
from the Esselte company would, however, come into force again
in an amended version in the event of termination of the
cooperation agreement.
Pursuant to the agreement, the parties set up for an unspecified
period a limited liability company in Hamburg known as Ceka
Europe, of which seventy-four percent is owned by A&R and
twenty-six percent by ECA. The new company will be responsible
for marketing the Cekacan method within a given territory
comprising several Member States and Austria and Switzerland.
Ceka Europe will also be responsible for leasing and installing
Cekacan machines in customers' premises, and holds the exclusive
distribution rights from A&R and ECA for the materials and
services necessary for the manufacture of ;Cekacan packages. Thus,
in order to supply customers with the materials for Cekacan
packages, A&R and ECA are obliged to go through Ceka Europe.
The two parties have undertaken not to compete against Ceka
Europe in the relevant territory by manufacturing and/or directly or
indirectly selling the products under contract and/or Cekacan
machines. Under the agreement, A&R also has a right of first
refusal, until January 1, 1995, to supply up to 100 percent of Ceka
Europe's requirements. After that date, Ceka Europe will be free
to purchase new machine installations from other suppliers though
A&R is to remain as the preferred supplier. ECA has the right of
first refusal up to January 1, 1995, to supply Ceka Europe with a
large percentage of its requirements for printing and cutting
laminates. After January 1, 1995, Ceka Europe will be entitled to
obtain printing and cutting services from other suppliers for new
machine installations though ECA is to remain the preferred
supplier.
The agreement will take effect for an initial period of three
years and will be automatically renewed unless terminated by one.
of the parties or if it becomes impossible for shareholders to agree
on a matter defined-as a major issue. Upon termination of the
agreement, the amended original license would come into effect,
with customers shared out between ECA and A&R so that ECA is
allocated customers domiciled in Germany and A&R takes over all
564
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other customers. A&R would also have the right to purchase all
ECA's shares in Ceka Europe. Following discussions with the
Commission, the parties agreed to remove a clause in their
amended license requiring ECA to purchase all requirements in
laminates for the body and bottom of the product from A&R. In
the event of the revival of the original license agreement, ECA
would be free to supply Cekacan packages to customers outside
Germany, either actively or passively. Under the amended
agreement, ECA will also have the right to respond to inquiries
from countries other than Germany concerning the leasing of
machines. On the basis of the foregoing and in particular the
modifications agreed by the parties, the Commission proposed to
take a favorable view of the agreement.
B. Pan European Mobile Telephone - ProposedExemption
On December 7, 1989, the Commission published a notice
pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17 announcing its intention
to adopt a favorable decision with respect to ECR 900, a
consortium formed by the German company, AEG AG, the Dutch
company, Alcatel NV, and the Finnish company, Oy Nokia Ab.
ECR 900 provides for the joint development, manufacture and
distribution of a pan-European digital cellular mobile telephone
communication system.1 7 The cooperation does not extend to the
end-products (mobile telephones) through which the users are
connected up to the system. The planned telephone system known
as GSM is a new telecommunication system which uses a new
digital cellular technique to improve communications between the
users of a mobile telephone network. In particular, the system
results in a substantial increase in speech quality and in the total
number of users possible, and allows additional data and
information technology services to be linked up. In addition, new
protective arrangements, such as authentication and encoding
mechanisms could be incorporated. Communication obstacles due
to differences in systems across geographical frontiers would be

17.
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removed and the way would be open for a single European
communication network, allowing a user to be contacted anywhere
in Europe. The potential buyers in the network area covered by the
GSM system are at present the national network operators in the
European Conference of Post and Telecommunications Authorities
(CEPT) countries and undertakings acting on their behalf. In
addition to the parties subject to the notification, the following
firms and consortia have emerged as suppliers: Bosch-Philips-ANT,
Matra-Ericsson, RacalPlessey-Orbitel, Ericsson, Motorola, and
Siemens.
Under the agreement, the parties will cooperate in the
development and manufacture, refinement of technical
specifications, and joint and exclusive distribution of the GSM
system and parts thereof in CEPT countries. The parties are setting
up the ECR 900 consortium for the purpose of the submission of
tenders for the GSM system. Although commitments with respect
to CEPT countries require the prior agreement of all parties, if one
party does not wish to participate in a tender, the other parties are
free to do so. During the term of the agreement, the parties may
not submit other tenders or conclude other contracts in the CEPT
countries in respect of the GSM system. Outside of CEPT
countries, each party is entitled to pursue business with respect to
those parts of the GSM system in whose development it was
involved. There is to be free exchange of documentation in the
case of developments in which several parties are involved, but not
of technical documentation where only one party is involved.
Parties are prevented from using technical documentation obtained
due to joint development activities until the eighth month before
expiry of the agreement. Thereafter, each party has the nonexclusive rights to use such documentation in order to manufacture
the GSM System or parts thereof. In the five years following the
expiration of the agreement, however, the granting to third parties
of a sub-license with respect to the right requires the prior
agreement of the party concerned, with any license fees being
divided equally between them. After this five year period, parties
are free to grant sub-licenses without sharing fees. The agreement
may be terminated by each party for the first time on December 31,
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1993, and thereafter at the end of each year. In the event a party
terminates the agreement, the other parties may decide to continue
their agreement. If the French, German, or other important postal
authority of a CEPT country has not selected the GSM system by
December 31, 1992, the agreement ends automatically.
IV.
A.

ABUSE OF

A DOMINANT POSITION

Building Materials Sector - Commission Intervention

According to press reports dated November 27, 1989, a
German company which refused to supply spare parts for
machinery it had sold to a U.K. building materials firm,
acknowledged that such a refusal constituted both a restrictive
practice under Article 85 and an abuse of a dominant market
position under Article 86, following contact with the Commission.
A complaint by the British firm, which bought the machinery,
alleged that the German firm had refused to supply spare parts in
order to protect a longstanding customer in the relevant territory.
The German firm ultimately recognized that collusion of this nature
with its older customer was a restrictive practice and that as the
sole supplier of the spare parts in question, a refusal to fill orders
from a new customer constituted an abuse of a dominant position.
The case is of greater importance, however, in that the Commission
commented that the matter could have been submitted to the
national courts. The national courts are empowered to award
compensation beyond which the Commission is authorized.
V. MERGER CONTROL

A. Merger Regulation Adopted
On December 21, 1989, the Council adopted Regulation
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings.18
The Regulation applies to all concentrations with a Community
18.
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dimension which under Article 1(2) exists when (i) aggregate
worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than
ECU 5 billion and (ii) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of
at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250
million. The Regulation does not apply where each of the
undertakings concerned achieve more than two-thirds of their
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same
Member State.
Concentrations are deemed to arise when (i) two or more
previously independent undertakings merge or (ii) undertakings, or
persons already controlling at least one undertaking, acquire by
purchase of securities or assets or by contract or any other means,
direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more
undertakings."
Joint ventures or agreements whereby
undertakings remain independent after the operation in question are
not covered by the regulation unless they result in the formation of
a joint venture which forms a lasting, autonomous economic entity.
Concentrations are appraised with a view to establishing whether
they are "incompatible with the Common Market." Articles 2(2)
and 2(3) of the Regulation provide that the decisive criterion is
whether a concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position
as a result of which effective competition is significantly impeded
in the Common Market or a substantial part thereof.
Concentrations with a Community dimension must be notified
to the Commission not more than one week after the conclusion of
either the agreement or the announcement of the public bid or the
acquisition of a controlling interest, whichever is first. The
concentration must then be suspended for the first three weeks
following notification. Within one month of notification, the
Commission must decide whether or not to initiate proceedings,
and within four months of initiating proceedings, the Commission
must, with certain exceptions, issue its final decision on the merger.
During this time the parties are free to propose changes to the
merger in order to avoid a negative decision. The powers to
investigate and to impose financial penalties are similar to those
19.
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provided for under Regulation 17. . Where the Commission finds
that a concentration is incompatible with the Common Market but
has already been implemented, the Commission may, by decision,
require divestiture. The Commission may impose fines not
exceeding ten percent of the aggregate turnover of the undertakings
concerned where undertakings fail to suspend the concentration as
required or put into effect concentrations declared Incompatible
with the Common Market. The Member States cannot apply their
national legislation to any concentration that falls within the scope
of the Regulation, with two exceptions: (i) the Member States can
take appropriate measures to protect "legitimate interests" such as
public security, plurality of the media, prudential rules and other
legitimate interests recognized by the Commission (Article 21(3))
or (ii) if the Commission finds that a concentration threatens to
create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which
effective competition would be significantly impeded within a
Member State, which presents all the characteristics of a "distinct
market," then it can refer the concentration to the competent
authorities of the Member State which is then free to apply its own
national competition laws.
Implementing legislation will be adopted with respect to the
details concerning notifications, time limits and hearings. The
Regulation comes into force on September 21, 1990.
B. Stena/Houlder - Commission Investigation
According to an official press release dated October 23, 1989,
the Commission, following a complaint by the French company
Comex SA (Comex) concerning the acquisition of an off-shore
diving services company (Houlder Offshore) by Stena U.K., Ltd.
(Stena), required modification of the terms of the acquisition before
allowing the deal to go ahead. Through the acquisition, Stena
acquired control of two diving support vessels which had been
available to Comex for inspection, maintenance, repair and
construction work on offshore stations. Stena further acquired
control of shareholdings owned by Houlder Offshore in two
competing companies, fifty percent in Comex Houlder, Ltd. and
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thirteen percent in the complainant, Comex. Stena is a competitor
of Comex for the execution of undersea works. By acquiring the
two diving support vessels upon which Comex largely depended,
Stena was likely to either restrict Comex's access to such vessels
or increase the cost of such access. Further, Stena's shareholdings
could create a structural link between two important competitors in
a highly concentrated market that was likely to influence the
competitive behavior of both Comex and Stena. As a result, the
Commission required amendments to ensure Stena and Comex
remain independent competitors. Stena is to sell the shareholdings
previously owned by Houlder Offshore to the Comex Group and to
lease one of the diving support vessels to Comex for two years,
thus guaranteeing Comex access to an essential input for the
execution of its undersea diving services. Following modifications
to the agreement, the Commission determined that effective
competition was thereby guaranteed and terminated its
investigation.
C. Coats/footal - Acquisition not opposed
According to press reports dated November 24, 1989, the
Commission has decided not to intervene in the bid by the U.K.
textile producer Coats Viyella to purchase its U.K. competitor,
Tootal. The decision was apparently based on the fact that over
two-thirds of both companies' aggregate turnover was generated in
the United Kingdom alone and reflected the logic that would hold
if the regulation on merger controls were in place. The takeover
would not fall within the scope of the Commission's competence
under the new merger regulation.
VI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

A.

Film Purchasesby German Television Stations - Exemption

On October 3, 1989, the Commission published its decision to
grant an exemption for agreements which allowed an association of
German broadcasting companies (ARD) to acquire the rights to
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American feature films and television films from MGA/UA Co.."
Through its subsidiary (Degeto Film GmbH), ARD concluded three
agreements with Algemene Financieringsmaatschappij Nefico BV
(Nefico). Under the agreements, which entered into force with
retroactive effect on October 1, 1983, ARD acquired exclusive
television rights to fourteen "James Bond" films, 1,350 other
feature films selected from MGM/UA's film library, all available
cartoons, and a total of 416 hours of television products to be
selected from the existing and future library of MGM/UA. In
addition, ARD was granted exclusive rights in inter alia Germany,
West Berlin, and German-speaking parts of Europe, to all new
"James Bond" films and all other new films released by
MGM/UA between January 1, 1984, and December 31, 1998. The
duration of the license for each individual film is normally fifteen
years. Films may, with certain exceptions, -be broadcast any
number of times by terrestrial transmission, cable or satellite. The
ARD organizations also acquired rights of first negotiation if
MGM/UA wishes to conclude a similar agreement with a third
party until 1997 or an output agreement for films newly produced
or acquired after December 31, 1998. After the Commission had
sent a list of objections challenging the exclusivity of the rights
acquired and the lack of access by third parties to the films, ARD
concluded further agreements with TEC. These allowed TEC by
means of so-called "windows" to license specific films to third
parties for designated periods of between two and six years in the
normal case, beginning in some cases before and in some cases
during use by ARD broadcasting organizations. The periods thus
amounted to a temporary lifting of the exclusivity of rights, during
which time ARD would not use the films. ARD would provide
*such third parties with a German version of the film if available,
and if unavailable, would contribute fifty percent of the necessary

20.
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dubbing costs. ARD also agreed to release the television product
which they had not themselves selected from the 416 hours allotted
to them. The ARD has further agreed to allow third parties to
broadcast the films in a foreign language version in the license
territory or to broadcast them into the territory from outside. The
ARD organizations also gave unilateral irrevocable grants of
similar effect to the MGM/UA.
In its analysis of the agreements under Article 85(1), the
Commission left open the question whether the rights granted to
the ARD organizations amounted to licenses in the legal and
technical sense or whether they involved assignment of rights for
a limited period and to a limited extent. In the latter case, the
restriction of competition lay in the fact that despite the transfer of
property, the broadcasting organizations could not grant sublicenses in Germany. On the other hand, if the rights granted
involve licenses, then the restriction derived from the duration and
scope of the exclusivity, following the Court's judgment in Coditel
II. The Commission concluded that both the extent of rights and
period of the licenses in this case went well beyond previous
acquisition practice of the AR]) organizations and exceeded the
necessary requirement of program acquisition and planning.
Further, although the films acquired represented only four and onehalf percent of the total stock available worldwide, the quality of
the films meant that the rights acquired had an importance beyond
the quantity involved. The staggering of the licensed periods
meant that the .duration of exclusivity extended beyond the actual
license period of fifteen years, some fifteen year licenses only
starting in 1998, with the result that other TV stations could not
have access to certain films even before the ARD license period
began. Also restrictive were the right of first negotiation and the
selection arrangements which resulted in MGM/UA not being able
to grant any licenses to third parties during October 1983-87, the
selection period, even for films which would not be subsequently
selected.
Nevertheless, the Commission granted an exemption under
Article 85(3) taking into account the agreements of ARD with TEC
and the irrevocable grant to MGM/UA by ARD in respect of the
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"windows" concluded at the Commission's request.
The
Commission considered that the agreements improved the
distribution of goods by allowing old films to become accessible
to German viewers for the first time. Further, the "windows"
arrangement permitted films to be shown by other broadcasting
organizations before or alternating with ARD organizations, the
staggering of such "windows" ensuring that a large number of
films could be licensed to third parties each year. A large
proportion of films could thus be shown before the ARD
organizations themselves broadcast them. New private stations
benefitted from the fact that dubbed versions were supplied and
that where such versions were not yet available, ARD organizations
paid fifty percent of the cost of dubbing. The lower price per film
resulting from the large number of films in the agreement enabled
ARD organizations to acquire more films than would otherwise
have been possible. The remaining exclusivity was necessary in
order to allow a fair return from the investments by ARD
organizations.
VII. POLICY
A.

Telecommunications - Council Meeting

According to a press release dated December 7, 1989, the
council has reached agreement regarding two proposed directives
which will ensure the liberalization and harmonization of
telecommunications in the Community.
With respect to the proposed deregulation directive, agreement
was reached on the material contents with the result that private
undertakings will be permitted to provide all telecommunication
services other than voice telephony, satellite transmission, and telex
services, while data-switching services are to be partially
liberalized. The proposal was adopted by the Commission on the
basis of Article 90 of the Treaty, which relates to its powers to
adopt directives under anti-monopoly provisions. A majority of
Member States contest the use of this article demanding instead
that the Commission should use Article 100A of the Single
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European Act.
On the same ,day, the Council adopted a common position
concerning a proposal for a directive on the establishment of the
internal market for telecommunications services, through the
implementation of an open network provision. Under the common
position, the harmonization of specialist connections and telephony
would commence from the date of the adoption of the directive and
a further directive for data-switching services would be adopted in
1992.
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